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Abstract 
This paper argues for the notion of 'infomateriality' as an orientation for IS research 
and as an alternative to and in distinction from sociomateriality. It sees Orlikowski’s 
relatively recent exposition of sociomateriality as developing out of her earlier work, 
which was heavily influenced by Giddens’ structuration theory.  Tracing the key 
philosophical tradition of process studies, through Bergson and Whitehead, and how 
they can be used and combined in response to Orlikowski’s work, it presents its critique 
of sociomateriality as a springboard and justification for the idea of infomateriality. 
Keywords:  sociomateriality, process philosophy, ontology, Bergson, Whitehead 
Introduction 
Having proposed the word ‘infomateriality’ in my book, Against Nature, (Kreps 2018) this short paper is 
intended to set out my thinking, as it stands at the present time, concerning the meaning and impact of 
this term.  At the time of writing, I am half way through a one-year British Academy Mid-Career 
Fellowship, entitled, Understanding Digital Events: A philosophical and sociological study of virtual 
experience in the everyday.  My hope is that, in the composition of the monograph that is due to be the 
main output of the project, the term, ‘infomateriality,’ will become much clearer in my thinking.  This 
short paper, then, is part of the journey towards that, and focusses principally upon what infomateriality 
is not, in the context of IS literature.   
It should be mentioned, also, at the outset, that it is not the word that matters, at all, in fact, but the 
unfolding concept. The process philosopher Henri Bergson, whose ideas are key to this project, frequently 
made a point of encouraging philosophers to continually remake philosophy.  John Mullarkey’s final 
remarks, in his book Bergson and Philosophy, regarding this encouragement are important here: “For 
Bergson,” he says, “philosophy is not about discovering the right expression to represent reality, be that 
reality a process one or not: the absolute is not comprehended simply ‘by giving it a name’. On the 
contrary, because logical essences themselves mutate, philosophy is about creating the right expression” 
(Mullarkey 1999, p. 185).  It is in this spirit that I approach the term, ‘infomateriality.’  The information 
systems field should also – if not indeed even more so - be continually remaking itself, and although 
proposing a ‘new name,’ I do so in the spirit that it is a modification of another one, ‘sociomateriality,’ and 
already ripe, no doubt, for further change itself; it is not the name, in other words, that counts. 
What follows, therefore, is mainly on why the term ‘sociomateriality,’ does not, for me, accurately describe 
our present reality, and why I therefore propose a new term.  This is then followed by a few thoughts on 
what it is I believe distinguishes the new term from the old, including a necessarily brief introduction to 
process philosophy.  Lastly, then, follow a few thoughts on what I believe – thus far - the new term to 
mean. 
Why not sociomateriality? 
Sociomateriality adopts both a grounding in Giddens’ structuration theory and in the ‘practice turn’ hailed 
by Schatzki et al.  I agree with Giddens’ support for Bergson’s durée, but find his use of it for his theory of 
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action (a) lifts the concept too far up into the sociological away from its ontological significance, and (b) 
contributes thereby to the de-politicisation of the social in Giddens’ political theory. The physical 
weightiness of power relations in practice, by contrast, seems better understood by Schatzki et al, whilst at 
the same time such practice-based discursiveness seems to fall prey to the very subjectlessness Giddens 
rightly fought in early poststructuralist thought. 
The primary source of the concept of sociomateriality is the work of Wanda Orlikowski, and her 
collaborators (Orlikowski 2000; Orlikowski & Yates 2002; Orlikowski 2002).  It is a fine concept and has 
proven extremely useful in the field, both for application and for what may be understood through 
critique – e.g. that of Mutch (2013), Leonardi (2013) and Faulkner and Runde (2013) and the critical 
realist approach they and others have taken in opposition to it.  The critique that follows here is neither 
critical realist, nor particularly Baradian, but also in no way meant to denigrate the concept.  It is simply 
important, when proposing a new term such as ‘infomateriality,’ to be clear, in the first instance, about 
why the term ‘sociomateriality’ does not suffice to express what I mean by the new term.   
As Orlikowski states, “These [structurational] models posit technology as embodying structures … which 
are then appropriated by users during their use of the technology. Human action is a central aspect of 
these models” (Orlikowski 2000, p. 405); and elsewhere: “In this paper we explicitly integrate the notion 
of social practices from this literature [Schatzki et al 2001] with that of enacted structures drawn from the 
theory of structuration (Giddens 1984)” (Orlikowski & Yates 2002, p. 685).  Foucault’s delineation of 
discursive practices, meanwhile, is overtly lauded in Schatzki’s introduction to his book: “bodies and 
activities are ‘constituted’ within practices. Foucault (1977, p. 138) for example, described how the 
constitution of present-day activity centrally consists in the fashioning of bodies … within disciplinary 
practices” (Schatzki et al. 2001, p. 2). 
There are some interesting problems and disparities, between these approaches, which highlight why I 
prefer not to rely on either.  Giddens’ structuration theory proposes objectivism and subjectivism “be 
reconceptualized as a duality – the duality of structure” (1984, p. xxi). Giddens borrows Bergson’s term 
durée in his texts (e.g. 1984, p. 3), and claims, “An ontology of time-space as constitutive of social 
practices is basic to the conception of structuration.”  His use of the term, however, is immediately 
purposed to his theory of action.  He professes that the analytic Anglo-American philosophy of action can 
“only sparingly be drawn upon,” because, “acts are constituted only by a discursive moment of attention to 
the durée of lived-through experience” (1984, p. 3). Thus durée becomes merely a “durée of social 
activity” (1984, p. 27).  Now, the concept of ‘infomateriality’ is similarly founded upon durée, but much 
more fundamentally than Giddens’ sociology. We shall, therefore, return to durée in the next section.  
Furthermore, although drawing heavily on Foucault’s concept of surveillance, and making use of the 
notion of the discursive, Giddens rejects much of poststructuralism, complaining of its “fallacious 
assumption that if there is no pre-existing or transcendental subject there can be no subject at all” (1979, 
p. 47) and in this specific point I am broadly in agreement. But in this rejection Giddens’ understanding of 
the role of power in society suffered enormously.  His political project, founded upon structuration theory, 
has brought disaster.  It has become clear, after its demise in the corridors of power, that “the Third Way 
is the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today” (Hildebrand & Martell 2012, p. 188). Giddens’ 
“depoliticization of the social” (p. 189) has endangered democracy and “democratic politics has lost its 
capacity to shape the discussion about how we should organize our common life” (Mouffe 2005, p. 52).   
Giddens’ support for a freely acting individual subject simultaneously creating and being defined by the 
structures of the society we live in, in light of poststructuralist understandings of the decentred subject, 
seem to “promote a recovery of the subject” that indeed lapses “into subjectivism” (Giddens 1979, p. 69). 
The entire power/knowledge matrix outlined by Foucault implies both dominance and resistance in 
absolutely all relations between people – power is never absent from any engagement (Foucault 1977). To 
suggest, then, as Giddens does, that the notion of power permeating society “implies that power is 
independent of human agency” is highly contestable (Giddens 1993, p. 173).  I support Schatzki, 
moreover, when he argues that human agency must be located within a wider field of agency that also 
includes non-human actors (Schatzki et al. 2001; Pickering 2001).  As Schatzki points out, “Objectivism 
alerts theorists overly fixated on human beings and their relations to the founding presence of 
nonhumans in human life. Humans and nonhumans … codetermine one another” (Schatzki 2001, p. 10).   
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Orlikowski has chosen, in these early papers, to prioritise specific elements of structuration theory in 
isolation, and to disregard the notion of discursive practices that is a significant aspect of Schatzki’s own 
work and those works that are more fully inspired by his thinking (Schatzki 2001; Pickering 2001). 
Schatzki does concede that, “Given [the] multiplicity of impulses, issues and oppositions, it is not 
surprising that there is no uniformity of approach” (Schatzki 2001, p. 2), however, I believe it is 
disingenuous to contend that the ‘practice turn’ can be used to support (especially in Schultze & 
Orlikowski 2004) an exclusively structurational perspective upon practices, that takes little or no account 
of the significance of the discursive, and less of the nonhuman.  
Now, clearly, more recently Orlikowski has herself come more closely into alignment with this contention. 
In positing ‘Situated Entanglement of Technological Performativity and Human Agency’ (Orlikowski 
2005) Orlikowski begins to make use of more discursive – and poststructuralist - terminologies. However, 
she does not support (or reference) her use of the notion of performativity, which is an interpretative 
understanding most closely associated with poststructuralist and postfeminist Judith Butler (2005). 
Butler’s own notion of performativity is situated very much within the poststructuralist discussion of 
decentred subjects, yet in her 2005 paper Orlikowski attempts to simultaneously situate a notion of 
performativity within a discussion of human agency framed by Giddens. I suggest that this short piece 
should be considered a work in progress that follows a reading of Karen Barad’s ‘Posthumanist 
Performativity’ (Barad 2003) paper which Orlikowski makes more extensive use of in 2008, in a paper in 
which Orlikowski acknowledges that her early more structurational work belongs to a ‘Research Stream’ 
that is quite separate – and I would argue at odds with – the ‘Research Stream’ to which she suggests 
Karen Barad’s – and her newer work – rightly belong (Orlikowski 2008). 
By the end of the decade, in Orlikowski (2008) and Levinas & Orlikowski (2009), Orlikowski has shifted 
away from the structurational basis of her early work, adopting the discursive and performative aspects of 
Barad’s (2003) ‘agential realism’ understandings to deepen and broaden her notion of the sociomaterial. 
This shift identifiable in Orlikowski is exemplary of a wider shift not simply in the theorising of 
contemporary internet phenomena within IS literature, but in those phenomena examined themselves. 
The ‘moment’ of Web 2.0 has already past, now, and Orlikowski’s work from the early part of the last 
decade can be argued as representative of approaches that sufficed to theorise it, at the time.   
In sum, the structuration theories of Giddens sit uncomfortably with the poststructuralist understandings 
of Foucault, Butler and Barad for whom networks of power relations are far more determining of human 
agency, and even less so with the notions by which such complex relations are additionally embroiled with 
the material constraints and non-human agency of the physical elements of practices.  
What distinguishes ‘infomateriality’ 
Process Philosophy 
It is in the founding ideas of early 20th century French philosopher Henri Bergson, author of the notion of 
durée, at the root of poststructuralist thought (Kreps 2016), and those of his contemporary, British 
mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, father of process philosophy, that I find 
ontological insight for re-examining the notion of sociomateriality.    
For process philosophers, in a nutshell, the future does not exist (Mesle 2008). Their first focus is to 
challenge the then prevailing orthodoxy of materialism. The primary assumption of materialist scientific 
rationality, that the most basic physical laws must reductively, or at least superveniently, determine the 
entire universe, is faced with the mind that thinks it, and proves false. There are two points here. Firstly, 
the historicity of the universe – that it began, and is continually expanding (Prigogine & Stengers 1985) – 
and the paradoxes of the subatomic – that by observing it, we determine it (Schrödinger 1944) – were 
both most uncomfortable breakthroughs for the scientist at the pinnacle of classical physics, Albert 
Einstein, for whom the universe was essentially static and permanent. By the end of his life he had had to 
accept both the changing universe of the astrophysicists, and the unsettling truth that his theories simply 
did not apply at the level of the microscopic, the domain of the quantum physicists.  19th century 
reductionist materialism had, perforce, to give way to something ‘looser.’ How loose, remains very 
controversial.  For some, acknowledging how the emergent properties of systems negate the claims of 
reductionism, the supervenience by which a system's upper-level properties are seen as being determined 
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by its lower-level properties is as loose as they will allow.  For others, as contemporary philosopher of 
science Nancy Cartwright has put it, such ‘fundamentalism’ amongst some scientists must be resisted: 
“some circumstances resemble the models we have; others do not,” she contends (2005, p. 34).  In truth, 
we have a patchwork of laws that apply in some cases, and not in others, and there are gaps as well as 
overlaps.  As Whitehead puts it, “There is very little large-scale understanding, even among 
mathematicians. There are snippets of understanding, and there are snippets of connections between 
these snippets” (1938, p. 46).  For many the faith that all the gaps will eventually be filled remains that – a 
faith.  Secondly, and even more fundamentally, it has become clearer and clearer that human subjectivity 
and agency simply cannot be set aside in the material understanding of the universe – reductive, 
supervenient, or patchwork.  If human agency exists, it must play a part in the unfolding of the universe, 
and so physical laws cannot determine all that is about to come to pass; we have a say in the matter: free 
will exists, and thus, until we decide which way it falls, the future does not exist – not just on a social level, 
but on a physical level, too.  
Bergson’s key idea is his reconceptualisation of space and time as durée reélle.  For scientists (at least 
since the late 16th century) time has been a fourth dimension through which spatially defined objects 
move. This spatialisation however, is, for Bergson, the root of a very special problem. His approach to the 
real is to understand it not in static, spatial terms, but as an indivisible continuum. Our predilection for 
conceiving of reality in spatial terms he contends has “no other reality than that of a diagram or a 
symbol,” (Bergson 1908, p. 293) and it is our apprehension of duration that truly grasps the real. For 
Bergson time and space are not divisible in the ever-unfolding present. Such a division is needed solely as 
a mechanism and vehicle to enact the intellectual study of the past.  Our real experience of time is one of 
duration, not of individual pieces of time that we may isolate and call ‘now.’ Our consciousness sits at the 
crest of that unfolding duration, and the seamless web of reality unfolds before it, becoming fixed matter 
that we can then examine scientifically after it has passed. Consciousness is here at the pinnacle and core 
of the real – conceived as duration – durée reélle - rather than as ‘static’ existence (Kreps 2015). 
Alfred North Whitehead, for his part, acknowledging his debt to Bergson (1920, p. 54), sees the 
bifurcation of the universe undertaken by scientific practice into a world of scientific objects observed and 
experienced by our subjectivities, as the reification of mere abstractions into a belief in a false picture of 
reality. For Whitehead, such ‘misplaced concreteness’ is attached to all too many pairs of opposites by 
which we try to understand the world, not least object/subject, time/space.  Whitehead develops a four-
dimensional geometry describing the onset, unfolding, and passing of ‘events’ in a ‘structure of events’ 
encompassing all the components of physics, chemistry, biology, affection, memory and intention into a 
seamless ongoing whole.  As with Bergson, Whitehead’s ‘Objective Data’ lie in the past, from whence they 
are gathered together into each ‘Actual Occasion’ as it unfolds, which in turn become Objective Data for 
the next Actual Occasion.  This process philosophy approach to an undivided and moving reality, perhaps 
a little more intuitive and personal for Bergson, and a little more geometric and physical for Whitehead, 
nonetheless for both philosophers merges human experience and agency within the physical unfolding of 
reality, in a manner intuitively apprehended by our common sense, and at odds with several centuries of 
scientific abstraction.  
In light of our discussion of Giddens, above, then, it will be clear to the reader that the notion of durée is 
far more closely entwined with the nature of physical reality than the strongly subjective sense in which 
Giddens uses it.  It is of especial note, also, as regards the later poststructuralist turn, that for Bergson the 
choices of the experiencing ‘I’ at the heart of the durée reélle, whilst powerful, are inevitably constrained. 
“While his consciousness, delving downwards, reveals to him, the deeper he goes, an ever more original 
personality, incommensurable with the others and indeed undefinable in words, on the surface of life we 
are in continuous contact with other men whom we resemble, and united to them by a discipline which 
creates between them and us a relation of interdependence” (2006, p. 14).  For the early Foucault, that 
discipline was all too suffocating.  Hence, perhaps, Giddens’ rejection of Foucault, in his pursuit of a 
sociology built upon human agency.  But in Foucault’s later writings he did indeed find room for 
“technologies of the self” by which one’s own personal kaleidoscope of the possible might carefully be 
made (Foucault 1988), and authors such as Butler who have taken this later work further have shown how 
we learn to narrate ourselves, albeit in ways that conform to the norms of recognition, and which thereby 
simultaneously “confer a certain kind of recognition on others” (Butler, 2005, p. 41). For process 
philosophers, subjectivity and disciplination are coterminous: neither the pre-existing human subject nor 
no subject at all. 
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Process philosophy and sociomateriality 
The understanding of time in the notion of sociomateriality, moreover, it seems to me, is closer to the 
attitude of ‘misplaced concreteness’ of which Whitehead complains.  Orlikowski and Yates (2002) devote 
an entire section to a discussion of the history of ideas on Time, but neglect Bergson’s and Whitehead’s 
key contributions. “Temporal structuring” appears, despite its attempts to short-circuit what they describe 
as a “fundamental objective-subjective temporal dichotomy,” (Orlikowski & Yates 2001, p. 685), as a 
nonetheless spatialised conception of time, laying out our activities as if upon some giant conceptual – 
and spatial - calendar.   Orlikowski & Yates’s notions of temporal structuring, and of Orlikowski’s later 
scaffolded sociomateriality, in light of process philosophy, can be seen as another means to present the 
spatialisation of the experience of duration. This is perhaps surprising for an author originally grounded 
in the ‘Research Stream’ of structuration (Orlikowski 2008), but there seems little in Giddens’ theories to 
underline how a process ontology ultimately holds that only processes are real, and entities, structures, or 
patterns are ephemeral.  Perhaps at issue is the broadly positivist bias of IS literature, up against which a 
process ontology has much to climb (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991; Liu & Myers 2011).  
Now, it is true, the ‘temporary’ and ‘emergent’ nature of sociomaterial scaffolds (Orlikowski 2006) does 
point towards a more processual notion of time and materiality, unfolding at the crest of the present, only 
understood as human and non-human, or cultural and material, when examined in the past; but as soon 
as we follow that direction of thought, the notion of scaffolds itself becomes part of the backward-looking 
and spatialised conception of what has gone, and must, therefore, ultimately, offer limited insight. Thus 
the ‘temporary’ and ‘emergent’ aspects of such ‘scaffolds’ are far more important than the static, spatial 
conception of how ‘users’ and ‘systems’ interrelate and interweave within them.  Such entities and objects 
are not the fundamental categories of being; rather, process is fundamental, and entities are derivative of 
or based in process. 
It will be of no surprise to the ANT-informed reader that Latour references Whitehead extensively in his 
work. In IS practice, then, understanding the fluid continuity of human and nonhuman ‘components’ of 
what have been seen in the past as systems and their users, and how ‘events’ might be seen as the central 
units of reality, I believe could promote a concentration upon lightweight, small, interoperable, 
facilitators, (e.g APIs,) in a constantly changing and open milieu with no boundaries or even any logic to 
its unfolding, enabling practitioners to keep up with the development of digital transformation.  Systems 
are increasingly driven by the patching of bugs, rather than by coherent design: especially in collective 
development models and perpetual beta approaches, each new version reveals a new set of bugs, 
discovered through use, which, in their patching, open up new functionalities and new problems, and new 
bugs (Gregg 2010). Rather than problematic this mode of development should perhaps be seen as both 
practical and in keeping with a more processual – and patchwork - ontology. 
The notion of ‘sociomateriality’ given to us by Orlikowski, then, is insufficiently durational to capture the 
encompassing flow of process philosophy.  One wonders what depth her ‘temporal structuring’ might have 
gained through a reading of Whitehead’s four-dimensional geometry.  The human subject of Giddens’ 
world sits, after all – perhaps through its rejection of the poststructural discursive - too close as a concept 
to the Enlightenment subjectivity to which objective reality is made manifest: precisely the division at the 
heart of the bifurcation against which Whitehead protests, entrapped by the intellectualization of reality 
Bergson enjoins us to see past.  Human action within a processual reality, in other words, is very different 
to one metaphysically beyond an objective world that happens to it. The significance of power relations, 
moreover, and the political ramifications of structuration and its depoliticization of agency, render 
‘sociomateriality’ dangerously inert for a critical information systems approach. 
What do I mean by ‘infomateriality’, then? 
The world of cybersociety, of the digital, of the virtual spaces that link us and the material culture we live 
in, have become so enmeshed and interdependent that we have embarked upon what might be described 
as an ‘infomaterial’ experiment.  The era of ‘big data’ - which is lots of our ‘little data’ - increasingly 
promises hitherto impossible insights into material and social phenomena such that information is no 
longer merely a social descriptor: the information society, like anthropogenic climate change, is changing 
the face of the Earth.  Our engagement, as a species, with the huge explosion in information in our 
societies, is responsible for both an acceleration and destabilisation of the kinds of global flows of material 
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identified by Wallerstein (1974).  Information flows and the remodelling of landscapes are increasingly 
interwoven. To quote but one example, take food gentrification, where, the fashion for avocados in the 
developed world is a direct cause of deforestation in Mexico (Bravo-Espinosa et. al. 2014). The 
ascendancy in the United States of climate change denial, arguably as a combined result of Russian 
cyberwarfare and the disinformation campaigns of right-wing billionaires (Cadwalladr 2016) may lead to 
80,000 more deaths per decade as its “attack on science” lifts the restrictions that prevented toxic 
chemicals entering the environment (Cutler and Dominici 2018).  Information and materials, in other 
words, interrelated since the birth of civilisation, are becoming interwoven in ways far more complex and 
interdependent than ever before envisaged. 
More profoundly still, this increasing interconnection of information and materials opens up new 
possibilities for understanding our role in the constitution of reality itself.   Michael Epperson, in his 
recent book, (2004), suggests that Whitehead’s four dimensional geometry constitutes a fourth - and 
better - description of reality than the three competing views in quantum mechanics: (i) that reality is 
basically particulate, with wave-like properties, (ii) that reality is basically wave-like, with particulate 
properties, and (iii) that nature is not “capable of fundamental characterisation at all” (Epperson 2004, p.   
ix). The fourth approach is to focus, of course, on becoming, rather than being, as Whitehead does in his 
philosophy of events, created at the same time that Einstein (i), Schrödinger (ii) and Bohr (iii) were 
creating their own views.  Wave-particle duality and quantum uncertainty, long thought separate 
problems, have recently been shown to be, in fact, the same ‘mystery’.   It turns out that the mathematics 
of “entropic uncertainty relations,” can be reformulated to describe wave-particle duality as well (Coles et. 
al. 2014).  Now, the moment you have a wave – whether pre- or post-particulate – you have a duration; a 
wave unfolds, and can only exist in time; matter, in short, ceases to be static, and objects cease to be 
discrete: precisely as Bergson and Whitehead had characterised them.  Louis de Broglie, the quantum 
physicist who pushed Max Planks’ insight into the wave/particle duality of photons further, to show how 
all sub-atomic particles exhibit the same duality, believed Bergson could be regarded as having intuited 
many of the discoveries of the later quantum physics. Speaking of Bergson’s Time and Free Will, de 
Broglie says: “this essay, its author’s doctor’s thesis, dates from 1889 and consequently antedates by forty 
years the ideas of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg on the physical interpretation of wave mechanics” 
(de Broglie 1969, p. 47).    
Now, as Karen Barad points out, the essential difference between Bohr and Heisenberg was that, “For 
Bohr, what is at issue is not that we cannot know both the position and momentum of a particle 
simultaneously (as Heisenberg initially argued), but rather that particles do not have determinate values 
of position and momentum simultaneously” (Barad 2007, p. 19). The uncertainty and duality are not 
merely aspects of our ignorance, for Bohr: our interaction constitutes what we discover.  This is, in short, 
ontology, not merely epistemology. My contention, however, is that Barad’s “shift from a metaphysics of 
things to phenomena” (Barad 2007, p. 33) does not go far enough.  Despite her assertion that “a lively new 
ontology emerges” (ibid. p. 33) Barad fails to mention either Bergson or Whitehead, whose philosophical 
positions seem to underpin what she is saying, and yet with greater clarity.    
With information and materials thus so intimately interwoven, we are led toward foundational questions 
about just exactly what is information, and how it may be understood - as I suggest it can - as materiality. 
Our use of the word ‘information’ stems from the rather anthropomorphic language the founding 
computing engineers seemed rather fond of.  As Checkland pointed out, instead of ‘memory’, pioneers von 
Neumann and Turing “could perhaps, have justified the alternative metaphor ‘storage’” (1988, p. 239).  
Checkland insisted, moreover, that “signal transmission theory” would have been a more accurate 
description than “information” (1988 p. 240).  In general, interpretivist IS stresses the difference between 
“data” and “information,” (Ackoff 1999, p. 170) the former being, for example, merely letters or integers, 
M, V, X, or I; the latter, when such bits are gathered into meaningful sequences: MMXVIII.  Thus, 
“information” is something by nature incorporating human understanding, meaning, history and also 
communication, in ways signal transmitted data do not.  Meaning in this sense, indeed, is causal (Markus 
and Rowe 2018).   
Laudable attempts in IS scholarship to push the definition of information beyond the 1940s formulation 
have been made in the 1990s (Lee 1994; Ngwenyama and Lee 1997) and since (Gregor 2006; Hassan 
2013).  As Gregor puts it, however, when it comes to ontology, in IS “there is scanty recognition that these 
questions are even of interest” (Gregor 2006 p. 612).  Information systems, I would argue, on an 
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ontological level, are bound to the material “motor accompaniment” of computing hardware, cabling, and 
the waveform behaviors of subatomic particles, but not governed by them, just as, for Bergson, our 
psychical life, while bound to its biological motor accompaniment, is not governed by it (1908, p. 83).  
Bergson’s model of the universe, as we have seen, is one based upon consciousness, for to exist today, 
consciousness must, perforce, have been inherent in the universe from the outset as a possibility, and thus 
implicit in the foundations of existence. Duration, as Bergson sees it, gives not only meaning to this 
existence, but moments of choice where those who experience duration also direct it, and constitute it.  
The material, in this manner, is underpinned and directed by meaning - not in the sense of idealist 
philosophy, where the universe all exists in the mind, but in the sense that mind and matter are two sides 
to one coin, a universe composed of both, wherein meaning comes from the conscious.   Thus, an ontology 
of meaningful information, and the data exchange associated with it, is that the material is not something 
separate, but something inherently a part of our experience of existence, and that experience is as much a 
part of Nature as the ground beneath our feet.  Meaningful information, moreover, as underscored at the 
beginning of this section, in our current age, is shifting such vast amounts of material around the world, 
that our geologists have declared us as living in the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002) - an epoch in which our 
world is so fundamentally remade by human activity that our impact must be incorporated into our 
understanding of its reality.   
In this sense, then, information can be considered increasingly material. Meaningful information is 
created and shared by us, continually adapted by us, and increasingly, as digital transformation unfolds 
and artificial intelligence rises to remake our world as fundamentally as steam, it is within information 
systems that we live.  Information systems are fundamentally embedded in both social and infrastructural 
systems, and fundamentally about communication – from mind to mind, and from autonomous systems 
to other autonomous systems.  Like sleeping policemen, for all their physicality, such autonomous 
systems are still messages, statements within the social, means by which we rise above automaticity and 
establish the freedom to be other than chained to the requirements of necessity.  It is in the manufacture 
of such tools, in invention per se, for Bergson, that the intellect distinguishes itself from instinct.  This is 
what makes us human and not animal: “we should say not Homo sapiens, but Homo faber,” he tells us, 
defining intelligence as “the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and 
of indefinitely varying the manufacture” (Bergson 1944, p. 153).  The robots set to make the information 
systems that will move materials around for us in the near future, are just such tools to make tools. 
Thus the “cybersociety,” envisioned by 1990s cyberpunk writers (e.g. Gibson 1993), seems already upon 
us: the latest industrial revolution (Schwab 2016) of robotics and AI seems ripe to take us a yet further 
step into a world made for us and by us, away from the natural habitat of our evolution.  Machine 
‘learning’ and artificial ‘intelligence’ (more anthropomorphisms I have critiqued elsewhere – Kreps 2017) 
and the augmented realities that are fast approaching, promise an almost completely intermediated 
world.  In this – and many other - senses, information systems are become key to our reality, determiners 
of what materials are, do, and are used for, as much as of who we are: in this manner as much as in any 
other, we live in an Anthropocene age (Crutzen 2002), and it is in this sense, in the manner in which 
information is physically instantiated, that I mean the term, ‘infomateriality.’ 
Conclusion 
Infomateriality, as a term, then, is meant in distinction from sociomateriality, in the following key 
respects:  
 it does not try to merge two ‘opposites’ – the social and material – founded, as it is, in an ontology 
that does not distinguish between them so fundamentally. Rather, like sociomateriality, the term 
‘infomateriality’ is indeed an attempt to overcome oppositional dualism, but not simply between 
information and materiality, but between subject and object, between internal and external, reason 
and experience, mind and body, agency and structure, organic and inorganic, Being and Becoming.   
 although sharing a process ontology with Giddens’ world-view, it focuses more upon the physical, and 
more upon the durational flow of ‘events,’ and less upon ephemeral social ‘structures’  
 although sharing relationships with quantum understandings of the universe with Barad, it 
acknowledges and embraces the philosophical oeuvres of those from whom the “shift in metaphysics 
from things to phenomena” arises 
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 unlike Giddens, it acknowledges poststructuralist networks of power relations and the mutual 
definition of the self in social contexts, but whilst at the same time merging such relations with the 
physical constraints of embeddedness, such that the two are not distinguishable for social science on 
the one hand, and physical science on the other 
 it acknowledges the key element of human meaning already inherent within ‘information’, whilst 
laying stress upon the anthropogenic shift of digital transformation: that we live in a world we have 
made and are rapidly remaking  
 it offers, then, in a way that sociomateriality does not, a perspective by which individual experience 
may be incorporated, alongside broader social and material conditions, in our understanding of what 
information is, and how its enactment is constitutive of individuals, societies, and the materiality of 
the world we inhabit.  
Infomateriality, then, is a concept for our time.  As a concept infomateriality attempts to capture – albeit 
perhaps inevitably briefly – a more accurate picture of the world we live in, at this time, and I commend it 
to any who would wish to use it, and perhaps improve upon its definition.  
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